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BRED MEAT: THE CULTURAL 
FOUNDATION OF THE FACTORY FARM 
DAVID N. CASSUTO* 
The angel went home. 
Isaac went home. 
Abraham and God had gone long before. 
But the real hero of the Isaac story 
was the ram.1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, the phrase “animal husbandry” has become 
more ironic than referential.2 The care and upkeep of animals raised for human 
consumption has devolved into an industrial operation focused on maximizing 
economic return while paying little or no heed to the needs of the “stock.”  
Though rife with practices that might otherwise invite governmental scrutiny 
and criticism, industrial agriculture in the United States operates in a regulatory 
environment that endorses and subsidizes its methods.3 
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 1. YEHUDA AMICHAI, The Real Hero (excerpted), in THE SELECTED POETRY OF YEHUDA 
AMICHAI 151 (Chana Bloch & Stephen Mitchell trans., 1986). 
 2. The term “husbandry” means “bonded to the house,” denoting a relationship wherein the 
interests of the farmer and the animal were linked in a symbiotic union. That symbiosis has become a 
casualty of the era of industrial farms. They have turned to “animal science” and “meat science,” 
disciplines that have emerged only in the last several decades. MATTHEW SCULLY, DOMINION: THE 
POWER OF MAN, THE SUFFERING OF ANIMALS AND THE CALL TO MERCY 270–71 (2002). Scully cites 
Bernard Rollin’s observation that “ethics and prudence were closely intertwined: the biblical injunction 
to rest the animals on the Sabbath expressed both concern for animals and prudence. . . . Ethics and self 
interest were organically united.” Id.  This union has long been absent from the landscape of industrial 
agriculture. See id. 
 3. See JIM MASON & PETER SINGER, ANIMAL FACTORIES—REVISED AND UPDATED 130–33 
(1990) (outlining in sections entitled “The Cost of Factory Tax Breaks” and “From Public Interest to 
Private Gain” how government subsidies to industrial farms have economically strangled small-scale 
farm operations); The Humane Society Files Suit to End California’s Battery Cage Tax Break, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060209154118/http://hsus.org/farm_animals/farm_animals_news/hsus_sues
_ca_battery_cage_tax_break.html 
 (last visited Jan. 5, 2006) (summarizing complaint seeking to abolish California’s “tax break to factory 
farms that purchase one of the most abusive confinement devices in modern agribusiness: battery cages 
for egg-laying hens.”). See also JIM JACOBSON, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE 
03__CASSUTO.DOC 7/20/2007  9:34 AM 
60 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:59 
Discussions of the nature of factory farming inevitably include issues of 
ethical treatment of nonhuman animals and often segue into apologies for or 
against “animal rights.”4 This article takes a different tack, asking instead how 
and why the factory-farm industry could grow ascendant in an era when the 
notion of the human–animal divide has become increasingly blurred. 
Contemporary ethological research and philosophical inquiry shows that 
characteristics that supposedly elevate humans to a privileged ethical position in 
relation to other creatures are either present in nonhumans or irrelevant for 
purposes of ethical discourse. In essence, the problem is that “we are not only a 
little like animals; we are animals.”5 
Consequently, making a biological argument that rights should be confined 
to humans is challenging on several levels. First, one must locate the biological 
criterion that definitively separates humans from animals—a problematic 
endeavor.6 Even assuming such a thing could be accomplished, one would then 
face the equally difficult task of explaining why a biological characteristic 
should determine access to moral consideration. 
On a behavioral plane, distinguishing “humanness” is equally difficult. Not 
every “human” trait is found in every human. As one commentator notes, “we 
do not treat possession of distinctively human capacities as a prerequisite for 
having rights . . . we acknowledge that infants, severely retarded and demented 
people, and other humans who do not have or cannot develop or recover 
such . . . capacities have rights and are entitled to equal consideration.”7 
Furthermore, most every human trait—be it language, tool use, self-
consciousness, or any other—can be found in animals ranging from dolphins to 
pigeons.8 
 
MANURE MONEY PIT: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL TAX SUBSIDIES TO HOG CONFINEMENTS IMPACT 
IOWA’S COUNTIES (2003) (outlining the way industrial farms enjoy significant subsidies in the form of 
tax breaks). 
 4. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2002). 
 5. MARY MIDGELY, BEAST AND MAN 1 (1979); see also Paula Cavalieri, The Animal Debate: A 
Reexamination, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS: THE SECOND WAVE 64 (Peter Singer ed., 2006) (laying 
out an argument based on classical utilitarianism that “if morality is to be coherent, speciesism—that is, 
discrimination based on species membership—should also be discredited.”). 
 6. As Donna Haraway notes: “Biology and evolutionary theory over the last two centuries 
have . . . reduced the line between humans and animals to a faint trace re-etched in ideological struggle 
or professional disputes between life and social science.” DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, 
AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 152 (1991). 
 7. Elizabeth Anderson, Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 277, 280 (Martha Nussbaum & Cass Sunstein eds., 2004). 
 8. See, e.g., TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 34–81 (1983) (dedicating an entire 
chapter to “the Complexity of Animal Awareness”); STEVEN WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE 
AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (2002) (chronicling various capacities of animals ranging from 
bonobos to honeybees); David Degrazia, On the Question of Personhood Beyond Homo Sapiens, in IN 
DEFENSE OF ANIMALS: THE SECOND WAVE, supra note 5 at 40, 40–53 (discussing the various 
cognitive and linguistic capacities of animals); GARY STEINER, ANTHROPOCENTRISM AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 18–37 
(2005) (summarizing contemporary ethological research in a section entitled “Contemporary Ethology 
and the Question of Animal Capacities”); JONATHAN BALCOMBE, PLEASURABLE KINGDOM: 
ANIMALS AND THE NATURE OF FEELING GOOD (2006) (arguing that animals experience the emotion 
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On the one hand, society seems to recognize the inequities involved in 
excluding animals from the moral community. On the other, it facilitates 
industrial agriculture, which has as its goal animals’ complete commodification.9 
These opposing trends and their ability to coexist present a complex social 
dilemma. 
This article argues that the ability of large-scale industrial farms to 
commodify animals in the face of strong countervailing social forces stems in 
large part from the legal system’s embrace of a secularized but nonetheless 
deeply religious vision of human ascendancy. Within this belief system, animals 
comprise beings through whom we define ourselves by contrast and to whom 
we deny ingress to the legal system. The impulse to increase protections for 
nonhuman animals is offset by institutionally privileged categories of behavior 
that commidify nonhumans and strip them of legal defenses. The resulting 
lattice of laws purports to safeguard animals while instead sanctioning and 
enabling the practices from which they require protection.10 
The human–animal dichotomy is no more a “fact” than any other religiously 
derived norm. Nevertheless, it enjoys a form of constitutional protection 
seemingly at odds with the Constitution’s Establishment Clause.11 It further 
leads to “speciesism,” a category of discrimination that makes membership in 
the privileged species a prerequisite for access to the moral community.12 
 
of pleasure in a wide range of activities); JANE GOODALL, IN THE SHADOW OF MAN (2000) (one of her 
many groundbreaking works on primate behavior). 
 9. See., e.g., SCULLY, supra note 2, at 253 (2002): 
Corporate Farming arose for the same reason all large corporations arise, as men like Donald 
Tyson, Frank Purdue, and Wendell Murphy realized that animals too, could be produced on 
an economy of scale in which costs per unit diminished the more units they produced. Mass 
confinement met vertical integration to provide the cheapest foods for the greatest number in 
the most efficient way, and consumers rewarded it. 
See generally JEREMY RIFKIN, BEYOND BEEF: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CATTLE CULTURE (1992) 
(discussing the emergence of industrial cattle production); Mark Drabenscott, This Little Piggy Went to 
Market: Will the New Pork Industry Call the Heartland Home?, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. 
REV., 3rd Quarter, 1998, at 79, 79, available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/econrev/ 
PDF/3q98drab.pdf (outlining shift in pork production to vertically integrated, highly profitable 
corporate agribusiness). 
 10. See GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 27 (1995) (“[T]he treatment 
accorded to animals under the law, is determined not by reference to any moral ideal but by the 
property status of the animal and to what conduct is perceived to maximize the value of animal 
property.”). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”). The clause is followed immediately by the Free Exercise Clause (“or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof”), with which it exists in delicate counterpoise.  As Justice Douglas observed in 
U.S. v. Ballard, 
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of religious 
sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed 
on which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the 
widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man’s relation to his God was made no concern 
of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for 
the verity of his religious views. 
322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
 12. The term “speciesism” was originally coined by British psychologist, Richard Ryder. See PAUL 
WALDAU, THE SPECTER OF SPECIESISM: BUDDHIST AND CHRISTIAN VIEWS OF ANIMALS 20 (2002); 
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Despite the dominance of the mythic divide between humans and animals and 
the economic and political ascendancy of factory farms, the discourse of species 
and its accompanying ethical issues continues to shift. Therein lies the 
increasing vulnerability of the idea of a singular, dominant species that alone 
possesses the characteristics necessary for entrance to the moral and legal 
community.13 This fragile notion of human ascendancy as well as the complex 
social trends undergirding it forms the foundation of this article. 
Part II of this article begins with a brief discussion of the factory-farm 
process and the supportive regulatory environment in which it functions.14 It 
then examines the economic predicates of industrial farming and its lax 
regulatory scheme. The system assigns worth to nonhumans based only on their 
exchange value. Humans, on the other hand, enjoy inherent value, which cannot 
be quantified and which protects them from commodification. 
Part III argues that the dominance of industrial farming (and other forms of 
animal exploitation) derives largely from the ascendancy of a religious belief 
that has attained a protected status within the legal system. Religion, for 
purposes of this article, is not an explicitly theistic concept, but rather refers to a 
system of norms based on hypothesis rather than fact.15 The religious principle 
at issue here is the notion of a morally relevant divide between humans and 
animals. The supposedly secular explanation of human social evolution offered 
by Sigmund Freud, wherein he purportedly locates the evolutionary moment 
when humans separated themselves from animals, brings this myth into stark 
relief. 
 
JOAN DUNAYER, SPECIESISM 1 (2004); see also, REGAN, supra note 8, at 155 (1983) (“A speciesist 
position . . . would take the form of declaring that no animal is a member of the moral community 
because no animal belongs to the ‘right’ species—namely, Homo sapiens.”); SINGER, supra note 4, at 6 
(2002) (“Speciesism . . . is a prejudice or attitude or bias in favor of the interests of one’s own species 
and against those of members of other species.”). 
 13. As Edward.O. Wilson observes, 
Those committed by religion to believe that life was put on earth in one divine stroke will 
recognize that we are destroying the Creation, and those who perceive biodiversity to be the 
product of blind evolution will agree. Across the other great philosophical divide, it does not 
matter whether species have independent rights or conversely, that moral reasoning is a 
uniquely human concern. Defenders of both positions seem destined to drift toward the same 
position on conservation. 
THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 351 (1992). 
 14. Here and throughout this article, the term “factory farms” is used interchangeably with 
industrial farms or industrial agriculture. 
 15. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (opining that, for purposes of qualifying 
for a religious exemption from military service, the test for whether a belief is religious is “essentially 
an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an 
orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption [from military 
service]?”). In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970), the Court expanded its definition to 
include the views of a defendant claiming conscientious-objector status based on his “beliefs” rather 
than his “religious beliefs.”  Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment, complained that the Court 
seemed to be embracing a “secular definition of religion.” Id. at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also 
Anand Agnoshwar, Note, Rediscovering God in the Constitution, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 295, 319 (1992) 
(citing Welsh and explaining that the Seeger standard is “based on supernatural assumptions [and] 
envisions that citizens often will act virtuously out of duty to their religion . . . and is appropriate for 
both free-exercise and establishment cases.”). 
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Part IV discusses the quasi-constitutional status enjoyed by the human–
animal divide. It uses a case study of the 1993 Supreme Court decision in 
Church of Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah16 to illustrate this phenomenon. 
Lukumi centered on a dispute between the city of Hialeah, Florida, and a 
Santería church that wished to carry out animal sacrifices within city limits. The 
Court struck down the city ordinances barring animal sacrifice, holding that 
they violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.17 By protecting 
animal sacrifice as a First Amendment right, the Court embraced the idea that 
nonhuman animals are subjects of rather than participants in the legal system 
and that their well-being is subordinate to human desires. 
This principle of humans as separate and distinct from animals is derived 
from and dependent on a fundamentally religious belief. It enables the 
fetishization of animals, either as commodities (as in factory farms) science 
experiments (biomedical research) or objects of ritual (animal sacrifice). 
Therefore, though Lukumi has no overt relationship to industrial farming, its 
reasoning nevertheless provides a powerful legal and cultural explanation for 
practices that subjugate and commodify nonhuman animals. 
Lukumi’s reasoning shows how animal subjugation as a matter of right has 
been woven into the framework of the nation’s laws. Effectively addressing the 
problems of factory farms—and other problematic forms of animal 
exploitation—will involve unraveling a tightly woven cultural quilt. It will 
require eschewing the unworkable notion of a human–animal divide and 
instead constructing a rhetoric of the “posthuman.” Part V of this article 
represents my attempt to begin that process. 
II 
THE FACTORY-FARM FOUNDATION 
A. The Factory Environment 
The animal-production process results from a legal and regulatory 
environment designed to facilitate animal-based wealth acquisition. This 
relationship has been well-documented elsewhere and need not be replicated 
here.18 The following overview serves only to illustrate the contention that 
industrial agriculture occupies a privileged place in the legal and regulatory 
scheme. 
 
 16. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 17. Id. at 546–47. 
 18. See, e.g., David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House: Animals, Agribusiness, 
and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS, supra note 7, at 205 ; Jim Mason & Mary Finelli, Brave New Farm, in IN DEFENSE OF 
ANIMALS: THE SECOND WAVE supra note 5, at 104, 120–21; Clare Druce & Philip Lymbery, Outlawed 
in Europe, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS: THE SECOND Wave , supra note 5, at 123, 123–31; Mason & 
Singer,  supra note 3, at 135–59 (entitled “Factory Agribusiness: The Farmer as Victim or Who’s 
Making the Real Money?”). 
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Factory-farm conditions vary depending on the species and the desired 
product. The common denominator, however, is an almost single-minded focus 
on economic yield. Chickens, for example, might be “broilers” or egg 
producers. The nature of their confinement and length of their life depends on 
their designated function. 
Egg producers must be female, so all male chicks are destroyed shortly after 
birth.19 The females are debeaked,20 toe-clipped, and housed in a “grow-out” 
facility until they reach egg-producing age. They are then moved to the laying 
facility and stacked in wire “battery” cages, three to ten birds to a cage, with 
each cage measuring less than two feet square. Often, several hundred thousand 
birds occupy one building, stacked in cages eight tiers high. The cages have 
sloped floors so that eggs can roll out of the cages on to a belt to be then carried 
off for processing.  Severely overcrowded conditions, wire floors, continuous 
confinement and the rigors of accelerated egg production21 cause the hens’ 
productivity to plummet after roughly a year. They are then destroyed. 
If designated as broilers, chicks (both male and female) are debeaked and 
toe-clipped22 and then packed by the tens of thousands in enormous sheds. After 
roughly six weeks of intense, overcrowded conditions on floors coated with 
manure and urine, during which time they constantly inhale the by-products of 
their waste, the birds reach market weight of approximately four pounds.23 They 
are then packed into crates and sent to slaughter.24 
Poultry producers aspire to create a battery-cage system for broilers but 
have not yet overcome problems including breast blisters, bruises, and excess 
abdominal fat.25 Nevertheless, the industry aims to create a system wherein cage 
production becomes the norm. As one producer visualizes it, chicks in cages 
 
 19. Methods of slaughter vary. Often the chicks are ground up alive, gassed, or thrown into large 
dumpsters to suffocate. Nicole Fox, The Inadequate Protection of Animals Against Cruel Animal 
Husbandry Practices Under the United States Law, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 145, 151 (1995); See Barbara 
O’Brien, Animal Welfare Reform and the Magic Bullet: The Use and Abuse of Subtheraupeutic Doses of 
Antibiotics in Livestock, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 417 (1996). 
 20. Debeaking involves using a hot blade to slice off the beak of a young chick. This procedure 
involves no anesthesia and is quite painful. Debeaked chickens have trouble grasping and swallowing 
feed. See Mason & Singer, supra note 3, at 39–40. Poultry producers claim this procedure is necessary to 
reduce feed costs as well as to deter “aggressive tendencies” (a euphemism for cannibalism) among the 
closely confined birds. Id. at 2–3. See also O’Brien, supra note 19, at 416; Fox, supra note 19, at 151. 
 21. Since 1940, egg production per chicken has doubled, from roughly 130 eggs per year to 260. 
This is a result of both genetic manipulation and techniques, including “forced molting,” designed to 
maximize egg production,  http://www.hsus.org/farm/resources/research/welfare/egg_industry.html (last 
visited May 6, 2006) (explaining that birds naturally molt in the fall when daylight hours gradually 
wane. Due to less sunshine, the available food supply decreases, and birds eat less, thereby ceasing egg 
production. Forced molting involves the abrupt withdrawal of food. The sudden starvation “shocks the 
hen” and shuts down reproduction. The post-molten period results in high reproduction. However, 
animals are motivated by hunger. The cramped confinement of the battery cages results in aggression. 
Additionally, forced starvation weakens the hens’ immune systems, resulting in the need for 
antibiotics.) 
 22. O’Brien, supra note 19, at 415. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See MASON & SINGER, supra note 3, at 6. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
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would be placed on a conveyer belt and transported into a confinement facility 
and then emerge on the other end as a finished broiler.26 
Other animals raised for food face analogous conditions. Pigs are confined 
in pens so small they cannot turn around or groom themselves. Soon after birth, 
their tails are amputated, their teeth clipped, their ears notched, and males are 
castrated—all without anesthesia. Upon reaching breeding age, females are 
inseminated and then confined for months at a time in “gestation crates” too 
small to permit foraging or nest building. Shortly before birthing, they are 
transferred to a “farrowing crate” designed to prevent all activity except eating, 
drinking, and keeping teats exposed to the piglets.27 When the piglets are 
forcibly weaned after roughly nineteen days (fifty-six days is the norm under 
non-factory conditions),28 the breeding cycle begins again for the sows.29 When 
the sows become too weak to gestate, they are killed.30 
The rigors suffered by chickens and pigs are not specific to their respective 
species. Cattle, rabbits, sheep, and all other animals raised under industrial 
farming conditions face similar travails.31 The laws regulating the factory-farm 
industry offer little protection to the factory-farm products. 
1. Federal Laws Are Sparse and Ineffectual 
The Animal Welfare Act,32 the principal federal statute mandating 
protections for animals and setting standards for their care, specifically excludes 
farm animals from its ambit.33 Without an umbrella statute under which to 
regulate, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) cannot promulgate 
regulations to safeguard the health and well-being of food animals.34 Even if the 
USDA could regulate the industry, it has shown little interest in doing so.35 
In addition, the Humane Slaughter Act,36 enacted to protect livestock from 
the often agonizing deaths that awaited them at industrial slaughterhouses, 
mandates that livestock be slaughtered using “humane methods.”37 However, 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. See O’Brien, supra note 19, at 419. 
 28. Mason & Finelli, supra note 18, at 114. Smithfield actually weans its piglets in seven to ten days. 
See SCULLY, supra note 2, at 275. 
 29. Mason & Finelli, supra note 18, at 108–09. 
 30. See SCULLY, supra note 2, at 269. 
 31. See generally MASON & SINGER, supra note 3, at 1–15. 
 32. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2147, 2149, 2150, 2155 (1970). Six years later, 
Congress passed the Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Animal Welfare Act]. 
 33. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g). 
 34. See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 18, at 207. 
 35. See Valerie Stanley, The Animal Welfare Act and USDA: Time for an Overhaul, 16 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998). 
 36. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-445, 92 Stat 1069 (codified in scattered 
sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 37. 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000). Jeff Welty, Humane Slaughter Laws, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 
183 (Winter 2007). 
